The Coach's Fatal Error? Taking On The Executives and the Infallible Executive Class

Transpired he could survive losing against lower-league opposition. Survive losing a crucial European final versus a particularly poor Spurs sides in living memory. He withstood home defeats to domestic rivals, a lowly league position, the tactical inflexibility, squandering the team's most promising homegrown talent, the 32% win rate, calling his team the worst in Manchester United history. But there was one adversary with whom the Portuguese coach would not be allowed to engage. If you challenge Jason Wilcox, and you best not miss.

And frankly, this whole bruising episode seems to paint the director in a different perspective. It may have been tempting, given his brief stint in a similar role at Southampton, to view him as little more than a drudge in the United exoskeleton: an individual who owed his position as much to his close relationship with his former boss Omar Berrada rather than any demonstrable skill. How wrong everyone was. By masterfully outmanoeuvring United’s feted manager, just as he bested the hapless Dan Ashworth before him, he has demonstrated as one of football's strategic masterminds: a strategic mind of which the club's mid-table rivals are now rightly wary.

A Strategic Clash Over System & Philosophy

To illustrate, it was Jason Wilcox who having been part of the leadership that appointed the 3-4-3 fundamentalist Amorim in the first place, played a key role in trying to persuade him to abandon his favored 3-4-3. Naturally, these entreaties met a certain resistance. However, such directives hold greater authority when issued by a man of a man the unimpeachable football pedigree he possesses, a veteran of international appearances and a contributor to a championship team decades past.

Maybe eventually he may be persuaded to outline his reasoning to the rest of us. Maybe one day questions may arise why Amorim is walking away with a full payout, without any penalty clause in place. The director speaks rarely publicly, for excellent reasons. The true intellectuals of this sport – men like Jason Wilcox – function on a plane exceeding our prosaic understanding. Were he to speak, probably we would perceive would be ultrasonic blips and four-dimensional whirring. Wanting is not quite equivalent to being prepared to receive.

An Supreme Power In the Throne

But of course, in training our focus on the sporting director we are obscuring the real power behind the club's current leadership. The director is, after all, merely executing the commands of his ultimate line manager Sir Jim Ratcliffe, who privately has emphasized his preference for a four-man defense. According to reports, the owner has also proposed deploying the forward in a wing-back role. Ratcliffe is keen for the club to embrace data science and analytics. Per reports, during a leadership summit early in his minority ownership, he announced that United’s style of play “shall be determined by this group”.

Ultimately, Sir Jim is an expert in this technical football matters, drawing from his background in petrochemicals and sailing. Most importantly he is incredibly rich, and as we all know, the wealthy are superior: more perceptive, more wise, strategically brilliant, fundamentally superior. Whom else would you trust to oversee an enlightened programme of cost-cutting, the building of a modern arena that appears a lot like an abstract design, the acquisition of a new striker?

A New Football Order: Executives Above Managers

This is a trend we are increasingly seeing at the elite levels of the game. Historically, clubs foolishly delegated big footballing decisions to subordinate staff such as coaches, scouts – players themselves. Maybe previously possible for an up-and-coming, visionary coach with ideas and energy to join an organization and implement their plan supported to fruition. But how many companies have such individuals established? How many large-scale layoffs have they managed? Far preferable to place the real power where it rightly belongs: the executive class, the casually dressed executives, the individuals with impressive professional resumes. Better by far to decide the tactics by the directors and hire a coach who can tailor their offering to suit. If coaches were once chefs, they have become more akin to delivery personnel: not creating the food, yet ultimately answerable if it arrives poorly or fails to meet standards.

In the meantime, a coach's role is increasingly not about crafting the philosophy and more about selling it: the receptionist on the front desk, the public face of an organisation they can do little to influence. A coach at Chelsea leads a team of very young players into Europe and secures two medium-sized trophies, and essentially is dismissed for talking. A manager at Celtic finds his reputation ruined while the people who hired him continue to make errors another day.

A Modern Corporate Football: Responsibility for the Few

And possibly on some microcosmic level this is simply neoliberalism at work: the rise of a gilded overclass who can never be wrong, whose decisions remain sacrosanct, whose errors can always be resolved by sacking without justification. Hire the 3-4-3 coach and then fire him for playing too much 3-4-3. Hire the project manager and then bin them for taking too long. And most importantly be grateful; for the incremental season ticket price rises, for your new player acquisitions, for the fact that the adults – regardless of their expertise – are in charge.